As we know, there is a controversy about the decision making under risk between economists and psychologists. We discuss to build a unified theory of risky choice, which would explain both of compensatory and non-compensatory theories. Obviously, decision strategy is not stuck in a rut, but based on the things, in the real life, and experiment materials, in the laboratory. We believe that human has a decision structure, which has constant and variable, interval, concepts of probability and value. Namely, according to cognition ability, we argue that people could not build a continuous and accurate subjective probability world, but several intervals of probability perception. More precisely, decision making is an order reduction process, which is simplifying the decision structure. However, we are not really sure which reduction path will occur during decision making process. It is why preference reversal always happens when making decisions. The most efficient way to reduce the order of decision structure is mathematical expectation. We also argue that the deliberation time at least has four parts, which are consist of substitution time, τ'' (G) dτ time, τ' (G) dτ time and calculation time. Decision structure can simply explain the phenomenon of paradoxes and anomalies. JEL Codes: C10, D03, D81.
I. INTRODUCTION
What is the origin of risk? It is possible to construct very special cases. My nephew, little Rugmann, is 6 months old. One day he got a mystery box from Schrödinger. His greatest pleasure is opening this box before going to sleep. Imagine little Rugmann play with the Schrödinger's cat every night. However, the morning sun never lasts a day. Several days later, he opens the box and finds a dead cat. At this time, little Rugmann is aware of risk, a risky box, a risky cat. He is so worried that he has not enough courage to open this box every night. In other words, the meaning of origin of risk can be illustrated by an idiom that they who know nothing fear nothing.
What is the human decision making? Sometimes we have to acknowledge that the experimental studies are different from the real life decisions. Decision strategy is not stuck in a rut, but based on the things, in the real life, and experiment materials, in the laboratory. So we could not build a theory without discussing them. It is no doubt that, according to our cognition ability, we could not build a continuous and accurate subjective probability world. That is, we can only establish several intervals of probability perception.
As we know, there is a controversy about the decision making under risk between economists and psychologists. For the most of economists, risky choice is based on a compensatory expectation-maximizing process. Alternatively, the most of psychologists think that decision making is a trading off process between different dimensions, such as risk dimension, value dimension. Necessarily, however, we strictly believe that we have to build a unified theory of risky choice, which would explain both of compensatory and non-compensatory theories. Note that, since gain and loss are two different parts of the decision under risk. For simplicity, we will just discuss the gain of risky choice and neglect the influence of non-strategy, such as emotion, intelligence, gender and others.
From a metaphysical point of view, first of all, we will discuss origin of risk, namely that the perception of probability or risk. It is no doubt that risk and probability are abstract concepts, which were acquired subsequently. With increasing age, little Rugmann establishes two constant concepts of probability, and the first cognition of risky or probability is 0, which means gain nothing. Then, he is promptly recognized the meaning of 1, that is gain everything. After that, Rugmann at least develops three variable concepts, near to zero a, near to one c, between zero to one b. All of five concepts constitute the first rudiment of probability system, which is called probability set. Moreover, with development of experience, new probability, p = 0.1, will be substituted by an appropriate element, near to zero a, of the probability set.
II. DECISION STRUCTURE
Decision making under risk is a process of simplifying the decision structure, which is distribution of probabilities and outcomes in the decision matrix. Let us give a new mathematical expression of decision making, which is called decision matrix G. More precisely, a relative position relationship of elements can be defined as a decision matrix. The top left corner of decision matrix shows the smallest element, and the bottom left corner shows the largest element. For instance, G 1 was showed as follow,
We first introduce some basic definitions for the sake of completeness. Definition 1. Let us define the operation of decision matrix, which is the Hadamard product of G 1 and G 2 , denoted by G 1 ° G 2 , the decision matrix as follows.
Definition 2. Let S p be the set of all probabilities. Now define the set of all acquired probabilities. G p = {a ∈ S p | a was acquired subsequently } Definition 3. The set of all substitution functions from S p to G p is denoted by {f:
S p (0) → G p (0); S p (P 1 , P 2 …P k-1 ) → G p ( ); S p (P k , P k+1 …P m-1 ) → G p ( ); S p (P m , P m+1 …P n ) → G p ( ); S p (1) → G p (1) Thus, G p = {0, a, b, c, 1} For simplicity, the decision matrix of probability G p as follows,
In the same way, we also give the expression of value, money, in the risky choice. The first rudiment of value system has two constant elements: zero and infinity, three variable elements: a' = small, b' = mean, c' = large.
Definition 4. Let S V be a set of value, S V ∈(0,∞). G v = {0, a', b', c', ∞} is a subset of S V . Decision matrix of value as follow,
Assumptions 1. The substitution does not stop until human can compare a superiority option, which must be substituted by a superiority position in the decision matrix.
Assumptions 2. A new probability or value will be substituted by appropriate element in the decision matrix.
It is assumed that there are two options: A (Pi, Vi) vs. B (Pj, Vj), Pi, Pj∈S p , Vi, Vj∈S v . For instance,
, the option B always has the superiority position in the decision matrix. This situation was called Zero Order Substitution, τ (G).
, the option B not always has the superiority position in the decision matrix. This situation was called First Order Substitution, τ' (G) .
, we don't know, options crossing, which option has the superiority position in the decision matrix. This situation was called Second Order Substitution, τ'' (G). According to Assumptions 1 and G c , we can deduce that Second Order Substitution will simplify to First Order Substitution during decision making process, which was called order reduction, denoted by dτ.
Thus,
, this situation was called risk seeking.
, this situation was called risk aversion.
, this situation was called value seeking.
, this situation was called value aversion.
Next step, we can deduce that there are 3 main structures:
(i). Zero Order Substitution, τ (G):
In this case, obviously, we can deduce that option B (Pj, Vj) is always appearing at the superiority position of decision matrix. Thus, we do not want to deeply discuss this situation.
(ii). First Oder Substitution, τ' (G):
Section 1
Up to now we considered the structure of decision matrix G.
In this section, the probability matrix has same position substitution. However, the value matrix has different size relationship substitution.
Section 2
In this structure, the most of non-compensatory theories have better fit. Namely, these theories believe that the decision making is trading off between two dimensions, which are probability dimension and value dimension. Let us considered (18) that we will neglect the difference of probability dimension, and make decision depending on the size difference between Vi and Vj, τ (G) = τ' (G 18 ) dτ. In this case, these are the decision structures expression of Equate-to-differentiate theory (Li, 2004) .
(iii). Second Order Substitution, τ'' (G):
Section 1. Options Paralleling
Up to now we considered the structure of decision matrix G. 
In this case, the probability matrix and value matrix have same position substitution. Thus, we cannot compare the A (Pi, Vi) and B (Pj, Vj) immediately. From assumptions 1, therefore, we have to substitute probability or value matrix further, during decision making. Let us considered (42) that if Vj > Vi, ′ will be substituted by ′. Then, (42) can be described as (18), τ (G 18 ) =τ' (G 42 ) dτ. In the same way, all of structure τ'' (G) can be deduced to structure τ' (G).
Section 2. Options Crossing
Unfortunately, in this case, we could not immediately compare the A (Pi, Vi) and B (Pj, Vj). In this structure, there are two sub-structures, such as options crossing, options paralleling. Actually, this structure leads to most of non-compensatory theories instability.
We have to acknowledge that the most efficient way to reduce the order of decision structure is mathematical expectation. Sometimes, we make decision based on a compensatory expectation-maximizing process. That is, we will calculate EV i = Pi×V i and EV j = Pj×V j. After that, we will compare EV i with EV j , and then choose the bigger one. However, the calculate process, which is expending vast amounts of energy. It is a dilemma problem if EV i = EV j or we are not able to compare relationship between EV i and EV j immediately. More precisely, decision making is an order reduction process, which is simplifying the decision structure. Thus, the deliberation time (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) at least has four parts, which are consist of substitution time t 0 , τ'' (G) dτ time t 1 , τ' (G) dτ time t 2 and calculation time t cal . In addition, preference reversal is an unexplained phenomenon. The preference reversal often happens on the second order substitution, options crossing or paralleling. At this time, we have to reduce the order of decision structure. For instance, A (Pi, Vi) and B (Pj, Vj),
Let us consider second order substitution (63) that the decision structure changing from second order to zero order. The different results were deduced from different paths. We are very certainly that the order reduction is an implicit process. Namely, we are not really sure which path will occur during decision making process. It is why preference reversal always happens when making decisions.
From the above assumption, we do not want to discuss merits or drawbacks nor and just want to explain most of current theory. We have now deduced the requisite laws of the decision structure, and we proceed to show application to compensatory theories of risky choice
III. STRUCTURE DECISION OF COMPENSATORY
Mainstream theories of decision making under risk hold that risky choices are based on a compensatory expectation-maximizing process. Furthermore, let us rethink these compensatory theories which reveal the relationship between options, S p and S v , and substitution elements, G p and G v .
According to structure of decision matrix, there are two options:
A (Pi, Vi) vs. B (Pj, Vj) Let us assume that a = k1Pi = k1'Pj (66) b = k2Pi = k2'Pj (67) c = k3Pi = k3'Pj (68) a ' = m1Vi = m1'Vj (69) b' = m2Vi = m2'Vj (70) c' = m3Vi = m3'Vj (71) As we know, a new one will be substituted by an appropriate element of the decision matrix, and from (66) In this case, it is the decision structures expression of the Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) .
IV. APPLICATION TO MORE DECISION PHENOMENA

IV. A. Allais Paradox
Firstly, the Allais paradox consists of two pairs of choices, each pair having two alternative prospects (Allais, 1953) . The first pair of Allais paradox is, A (Pi = 1, Vi = 1 000 000) vs. B (Pj 1 = .1, Vj 1 = 5 000 000; Pj 2 = .89, Vj 2 = 1 000 000; Pj 3 = .01, Vj 3 = 0). Let us consider the structure of Allais paradox, Pi → 1, Vi → ′;
Pj 1 → , Vj 1 → ′;
Pj 2 → , Vj 2 → ′;
Pj 3 → , Vj 3 → 0.
In this case, we can deduce, the option A always has superiority position in the decision matrix, that the option A > B.
The second pair of choice is, C (Pi 1 = .11, Vi 1 = 1 000 000; Pi 2 = .89, Vi 2 = 0) vs. D (Pj 1 = .1, Vj 1 = 5 000 000; Pj 2 = .9, Vj 2 = 0).
Where, Pi 1 → , Vi 1 → ′; Pi 2 → , Vi 2 → 0;
Pj 2 → , Vj 2 → 0;
In this case, the (76) also can be described as (44). Namely, the (76) is a variation structure of the two order substitution. As mentioned above, all of two order substitution structures can be reduced to one order substitution structures.
Thus, we can deduce that option C < D.
IV. B. The Performance of π Function
As we know, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) was discussed the weighting function π, which relates decision weights to stated probabilities. They believe that large and intermediate probabilities are underweighted while small probabilities are overweighted.
Let us assume that the elements of probability matrix consist of {0, a = .3, b = .5, c = .7, 1}. In addition, Pi is a small probability, from 0 to 0.35; Pj is an intermediate probability, from .35 to .7; Pk is a large probability, from .7 to 1.
So, let us discuss the substitution of probability matrix. Where, G p = ( 1 ), a< b< c<1.
Pi → = .3; Pj → = .5; Pk → = .7. Thus, (a) If Pi < , the small probabilities are overweighted. From the above assumption, we can deduce why the weighting function π has these performance. However, it is known that the value range is larger than probability range in experiments. Obviously, the substitutive range is, ′< ′< ′. That is, we can also deduce, from value matrix, that the value function is generally concave for gain. In addition, the decision structure can simply explain the phenomenon of subadditive, subcertainty and subproportionality. (1961) propose that suppose you have an urn containing 30 red balls and 60 other balls that are either black or yellow. The balls are well mixed so that each ball is as likely to be drawn as any other.
IV. C. Ellsberg Paradox
Ellsberg
Gamble 
Ellsberg's results have been replicated many times, people strictly prefer Gamble A to B, and prefer Gamble D to C. The most of researchers believe that the experimental evidence suggests that people prefer risk to uncertainty. That is, according to decision structure that the result of (78), equivalent to (53), is A > B, and result of (80), equivalent to (46), is D > C. Therefore, the experimental evidence suggests that P B → , P B < P A = Namely that, each probability of ball, draw a black ball (Gamble B) or draw a yellow ball (Gamble C), is an individual event.
Thus, P B = p = P C = q = 1 3 + ≠ 1-p From the above assumption, we can deduce two requisite laws of the decision group that a) A new probability will be substituted by an appropriate element of probability matrix, when we facing a risky situation. b) A new uncertainty probability will be substitute by a minimal element of probability matrix, when we facing an uncertainty situation.
V. CONCLUSION
It is understandable that the better strategy is conservatively estimated the possibility of gain when we facing uncertainty from an evolutionary perspective. Actually, the Ellsberg paradox is not a real paradox, but a clue to understand what risk and uncertainty are. In the next step, we have to predict that the substitution, structure order reduction and calculation process might act on specific regions of the brain to regulate decision making. But the substitution and order reduction may not be separated out and directly observe with current technology.
Finally, life is complex and dynamic, we are almost certainly that the above assumption just discuss from a particular and simplest condition, which is a second order matrix. Along with the theory development, we have to reconsider what risky choice and decision structure are. We can deeply understand this complex process if all decision structures can be perfectly known. Our experience is far from being sufficient to enable us to accurately explanation what the decision making is. But, we wish to provide a different with the former method.
In course of time, the mathematical consequences will be gradually deduced, and decision structure concepts, will be reconciled to the new ideas of decision making, in the prospect that they may lead to pre-established harmony between mathematics and decision making.
